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I. INTRODUCTION
Montana is, and has been for generations, a paradise for outdoor
recreation.1 From the days of Lewis and Clark,2 it was apparent that
I. "[Montana has]... recreational delights of more than 200 miles of truly 'Wild'
free-flowing rivers unaccessible except by boat or trail, 450 miles of unspoiled 'Blue Ribbon'
rivers, 1600 tributaries ranging from foaming mountain cataracts to meandering valley
brooks and with a combined total of 11,000 miles of top-flight fishing waters, and 1500 lakes
ranging from crystal clear mountain jewels, to small ponds, to inland seas 150 miles long."
D. KoNiZESKI, I THE MoNrANAN's FIsmNG GUIDE at v (1970) (citations omitted).
2. Captain Meriwether Lewis reported: "In the river we see a great abundance of fish,
but we cannot tempt them to bite by anything on our hooks." Captain Lewis and the entire
expedition were camped at the headwaters of the Missouri River near present-day Three
Forks on July 29, 1805, when he made that entry into his journal. 2 LEwis AND CLARK
JouRNALs 14 (1904). Captain Lewis also reported that the "Gallatin River is however the
most rapid of the three [Gallatin, Jefferson, and Madison Rivers], and though not quite
deep, yet navigable for a considerable distance." Id at 13.
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this state's waterways would be a haven for people who like to fish 3 and
float.4 This has caused an increased demand for recreation and has led
to conflicts5 and litigation.6 While members of the public eagerly use
waterways for recreation, many landowners have growing fears about
damage to their land. Consequently, the problem has become one of
balancing the rights of landowners against the desires of members of
the public to fish and float on Montana's waterways.
The belief that the public has the right to use and enjoy water
resources is a time-proven doctrine, honored throughout the ages.7
Traditionally, American courts and legislatures have employed a strict
standard of navigability to determine the public's right to use water-
ways.' If the waterway was navigable, anyone could use it for public
purposes.9 Gradually, courts and legislatures have backed away from
this strict navigability standard in favor of a more flexible and usable
public use standard.'" The trend now is to include recreational use as a
recognized public use."
Conflicts between landowners and members of the public who de-
sire to fish and float will worsen in the future because of increasing
demand by recreationists for access to water coupled with the unsettled
law in this area. Steps should be taken now to insure harmony among
all parties. This comment will present suggestions for those steps and,
in doing so, will discuss rights of the public to use Montana's water-
ways for recreational purposes.' It will begin with a discussion of his-
torical navigability, and then treat modem trends of the courts in the
area of recreational water use. This comment will argue that determi-
nation of public rights on Montana's waterways should be based upon
3. E.g., 293,000 copies of the "1981-1982 Montana Fishing Regulations" were
published.
4. Eg., Fischer, The Floater's Guide, MONTANA OUTDOORS, May-June, 1977, at 19-
35, lists twenty-seven rivers and describes them as Montana's most popular float streams.
5. See, e.g., Lindler, Floaters, landowners dispute is a needless one, Great Falls Trib-
une, June 22, 1981, at 9-A, col. 1.
6. Eg., the Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. sued to have two rivers, the
Dearborn and the Beaverhead, declared open for public recreational use. Id
7. "The belief that water resources are a public asset, subject to a unique pattern of
use and management runs in an almost unbroken line from Roman times to the present."
Abrams, Recreational Water Use, 59 OR. L. REv. 159, 162 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Abrams] (presents a detailed history of public uses of water).
8. Stone, Public Rights in Water, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 37.1 (R. Clark
ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as WATERS].
9. Abrams, supra note 7, at 167.
10. See Johnson and Austin, Recreational Rights and Titles to Beds on Western Lakes
and Streams, 7 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Johnson and Austin].
11. Abrams, supra note 7, at 167.
12. This writing will update Professor Albert W. Stone's 1971 article Legal Background
on Recreational Use of Montana Water, 32 MONT. L. REv. I (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Stone].
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a standard of potential significant recreational use, rather than a stan-
dard based upon navigability and title to beds of waterways.
II. NAVIGABILiTY
As a general rule, the public has the right to use navigable water-
ways.13 Therefore, any discussion of recreational water use must begin
with a study of navigability. Navigability is not easily defined as it is a
term that has several meanings. 4
In describing navigability, it is best to examine various analytical
tests used by courts. Early in the development of navigability stan-
dards in this country, American courts rejected the English test, based
upon ebb and flow of tides, by labeling it inappropriate for this
continent.15
Several general rules developed as courts became more comforta-
ble defining navigability. For determination of title,'6 or when naviga-
bility must be defined for federal purposes17 such as regulation of
interstate commerce,' 8 the so-called federal test applies. The federal
test defines navigability generally as the capacity of a waterway for use
as a highway for commerce." For all other purposes, states may em-
ploy their own test,2" which may be less restrictive than the federal test.
Consequently, states have developed a wide variety of tests to deter-
mine navigability for various local purposes including recreation.2' The
Supreme Court expressly allowed states to make this determination in
the 1912 case Donnelo v. United States.22 The Court declared:
"[W]hat shall be deemed a navigable water within the meaning of the
local rules of property is for the determination of the several states." 23
13. Rich, Managing Recreational Rivers, 8 AKRON L. REv. 43 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Rich].
14. Id at 1-33.
15. The U.S. Supreme Court expressly rejected the English test of navigability in The
Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (14 Wall.) 557. "The doctrine of the common law as to the navigability
of waters has no application in this country. Here the ebb and flow of the tide do not
constitute the usual test, as in England, or any test at all of the navigability of waters." Id at
563.
16. See text accompanying notes 25-45 infra.
17. Some federal purposes are maritime jurisdiction, regulation under the commerce
clause, and title disputes between state and federal governments. State v. McIlroy, 268 Ark.
227, 234, 595 S.W.2d 659, 663 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 843. See also Rich, supra note
13, at 46.
18. See text accompanying notes 46-56 infra.
19. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (14 WalL) 557 (1870).
20. Rich, supra note 13, at 46.
21. See text accompanying notes 62-106 infra.
22. 228 U.S. 243 (1912).
23. Id at 262. See also Oregon ex rel State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel
Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977) (state law rather than federal common law applied to determine
title to exposed land which was once under a navigable river); noted in Supreme Court De-
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A. The Federal Test
The federal test is used for determination of navigability for fed-
eral purposes, 24 two of which are: determination of title to beds of wa-
terways and regulation under the Commerce Clause.
1. Determination of Who Holds Title to Beds
As a general rule, those who own the bed of a waterway can dic-
tate who may use its surface.2" If the state owns the bed, the public has
a right to use the surface.26 Where the state owns the bed of a water-
way, it holds it in trust for the use of the people.2 1 If the bed is pri-
vately owned, then the public may have some rights to the use of the
surface, depending upon local law.28
Navigability for purposes of determining title had its beginnings in
the mid-nineteenth century. In the 1842 United States Supreme Court
case Martin v. Waddell, 29 a controversy arose involving a dispute over
title to tidal beds under navigable waters off New Jersey. The Court
found that title to all tidal beds was originally in the British Crown and
that each of the thirteen colonies succeeded to title of the tidal beds
after American independence.3" The Court said that after the Revolu-
tion, "the people of each state became themselves sovereign."'" In that
character, states "hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters
and the soils under them for their own common use."32
The Martin doctrine was expanded three years later in Pollard v.
Hagen,33 when the Supreme Court applied it equally to all states, in-
cluding those admitted after the original thirteen. The Court used an
"equal footing" 34 rationale: "[T]he new states have the same rights,
sovereignty, and jurisdiction over. . . [navigable waters] . . . as the
original states. ' 35 The Court, in a long line of cases since then, has
c/ares State Law Controls Riverbed Title Issues, 7 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10045
(1977).
24. Others include maritime and admiralty jurisdiction. See generally Adams v. Mon-
tana Power Co., 528 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1975) (discussion of navigability for purposes of
exercising admiralty jurisdiction).
25. See Annot., 6 A.L.R.4th 1030, 1034 (1981).
26. Johnson and Austin, supra note 10, at 7.
27. Abrams, supra note 7, at 168.
28. Rich, supra note 13, at 50.
29. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1843).
30. Id at 410.
31. Id
32. Id
33. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
34. See Leighty, The Source and Scope of Public and Private Rights in Navigable Wa-
ters, 5 LAND & WATER L. REV. 391, 415-18 (1971).
35. Pollard v. Hagen, 44 U.S. at 230.
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applied the doctrine of state ownership of beds to non-tidal inland wa-
ters as well as to tidal waters.3 6 These cases have established state own-
ership of lands beneath navigable waterways.37
In 1870, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of The
Daniel Ball.31 Even though The Daniel Ball arose out of a question of
Commerce Clause navigability,39 it set the standard used today to de-
termine navigability for purposes of deciding bed ownership.40 The
Court held that the test to be applied when deciding who holds title to
the bed of a waterway is one based upon the waterway's, capacity for
commerce.4" The Court, in an often-quoted passage, stated:
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law
which are navigable infact. And they are navigable in fact
when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their
ordinary condition, as highways for commerce over which
trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary
modes of trade and travel on water.42
While The Daniel Ball established the standard for determining
navigability when the concept is used to define bed ownership, subse-
quent decisions have made important refinements in its application.
For instance, navigability for title must be determined as of the date of
statehood.43  In 1926, in United States v. Holt State Bank,' the
Supreme Court declared that navigability for purposes of determining
title is a federal question and the federal test from The Daniel Ball
should be used for its determination.45
2. Commerce Clause
Navigability for purposes of federal regulation under the Com-
merce Clause arose out of the 1824 case Gibbons v. Ogden,47 where
36. Stone, supra note 12, at 3 n.10 (citing United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1945);
United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1926); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49
(1926); Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77 (1922); Packer v. Bird,
137 U.S. 661 (1891); Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 (1891); Barney v. City of Keokuk, 94
U.S. 324 (1876)).
37. Stone, supra note 12, at 3.
38. 77 U.S. (14 WaIL) 557 (1870).
39. Id at 562-63.
40. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926), solidified the test from The
.Daniel Ball as the standard to be used for purposes of determining bed ownership.
41. See Annot., 6 A.L.R.4th 1030, 1036 (1981).
42. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563 (emphasis added).
43. United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 408 (1940). See
also Stone, supra note 12, at 3-4.
44. 270 U.S. 49 (1926).
45. Id at 55-56.
46. U.S. Cost. art. L § 8, cL 3.
47. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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the Court declared that Congress has power to regulate interstate com-
merce and may declare a waterway navigable for purposes of federal
regulation.48 Congress may regulate commerce on a waterway even if
title to the bed of that waterway is held by a state.49 Unlike navigabil-
ity for purposes of determining title, navigability for purposes of regu-
lation under the Commerce Clause need not be determined as of the
date of statehood; it may be made at any time." As with title naviga-
bility, several refinements were made in Commerce Clause navigabil-
ity, most of them coming in the 1940 case United States v. Appalachian
Electric Power Co. 5 In Appalachian, the Court held that a waterway is
not barred from being declared navigable merely because improve-
ments are necessary to make it suitable for commercial navigation.5
2
Appalachian is confusing because the Court decided a Commerce
Clause case but based its decision on title navigability. The Court in
Appalachian thus left open the question of whether, for title navigabil-
ity as well as Commerce Clause navigability, waters may be declared
navigable when they can be made so with reasonable improvements. 3
Authorities tend to believe that Appalachian should only be applied for
purposes of Commerce Clause navigability, and that for purposes of
determining title, waters must be usable in their natural state without
need of improvements. 4
Appalachian further established the permanency of navigability:
"[W]hen once found to be navigable, a waterway remains so."" The
Appalachian Court also declared it is not necessary that use be continu-
ous for navigability for purposes of regulation of commerce: "Even ab-
sence of use over long periods of years . . does not affect the
navigability of rivers in the constitutional sense."56
B. Various State Tests
Generally, state tests employ two different standards in determin-
ing navigability: "commercial use"'57 and "recreational use."5"
48. See also Johnson and Austin, supra note 10, at 13-14.
49. Montana Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 185 F.2d 491 (1950).
50. Stone, supra note 12, at 5-6.
51. 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
52. Id at 407.
53. See Johnson and Austin, supra note 10, at 17-19 (detailed discussion of
Appalachian).
54. Id
55. Appalachian, 311 U.S. at 408.
56. Id at 409-10.
57. See generally Johnson and Austin, supra note 10, at 20-21.
58. See generally Stone, supra note 12, at 6-8.
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1. Commercial Use Standard
Originally, states primarily used commercial use standards to de-
termine navigability. Commercial use standards are consistent with the
federal test established in The Daniel Ball because their primary crite-
rion is the commercial capacity of a waterway. One early test to deter-
mine commercial capacity was the "saw-log" test, which uses as its
basis the capacity of a waterway to float logs for commercial use.59 The
"saw-log" test remains the traditional method used today for determi-
nation of navigability by means of a commercial use standard.60 Other
states employ the more obvious tests based upon standards of use by
cargo or passenger-carrying vessels. 6
2. Recreational Use Standard
The need for a recreational use standard arose when states were
faced with growing demand for recreational water use.62 With the
adoption of recreational use standards, the states may more easily de-
clare rivers open for public recreational use.63 Tests based upon recre-
ational use standards may not be used for determination of who holds
title to the bed of the waterway; they can only be used for determina-
tion of use of the waterway."
Courts generally hold that waterways which have been declared
navigable for determination of title65 are open for public recreational
use. 66 Similarly, if a waterway has been declared navigable for pur-
poses of regulation under the Commerce Clause67 or under a state test
based upon a commercial use standard,68 courts generally hold that the
public has the right to use it for recreational purposes. 69 The problem,
then, arises when a waterway has not been declared navigable for title
purposes, for commercial use, or for regulation under the Commerce
Clause. For waterways in this group, courts have created tests for de-
termination of navigability based upon recreational use standards,
which are different from traditional standards used for the federal test.
59. See Johnson and Austin, supra note 10, at 10-21 (analysis of saw-log test and its
origins).
60. See Southern Idaho Fish & Game Ass'n. v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 96 Idaho 360,
528 P.2d 1295 (1974) (evidence that persons floated logs with diameters in excess of six
inches down creek supported finding that creek was navigable).
61. Rich, supra note 13, at 46.
62. Id at 47.
63. Stone, upra note 12, at 7.
64. See Johnson and Austin, supra note 10, at Ipassim.
65. See text accompanying notes 25-45 supra.
66. Rich, supra note 13, at 45.
67. See text accompanying notes 46-56 supra.
68. See text accompanying notes 59-61 supra.
69. Rich, supra note 13, at 45.
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States have adopted a variety of tests7" for determination of navigabil-
ity for recreational use because they are not bound to follow strict fed-
eral commercial capacity standards. Naturally, a different result may
follow when a court uses one standard instead of another.
Many state courts have adopted some form of test for navigability
utilizing a recreational use standard. The cases from these courts estab-
lish that a river is navigable for public recreational use without deter-
mining who holds title. One significant case, decided by the Arkansas
Supreme Court in 1980, is State v. McIlroy.7 1 Certiorari was denied
that same year by the United States Supreme Court. The Mhl'roy
court discarded the traditional test of navigability, based upon com-
mercial value, calling it a "remnant of the steamboat era."72 In its
place, the court adopted a new state test for navigability based upon a
recreational use standard.73 The court explained its rejection of the
traditional standard and adoption of a recreational use standard by
saying that the previous decisions may not have "anticipate[d] such use
of streams which are suitable . . . for recreational use."'74 The court
held that the river in controversy was "navigable at that place with all
the incidental rights of that determination."75 MIlroy also holds that
a river which can be used for a substantial portion of the year for recre-
ational purposes is navigable.76
The Michigan Supreme Court utilized a recreational use standard
in 1974 when it decided Kelley ex rel MacMullen v. Hallden.77 The
court found that a test for navigability may be based solely upon a
recreational use standard: "[R]ecreational uses alone can support a
finding of navigability."78 The court found that a river was navigable,
even though there was no evidence of commercial use.79 In doing so, it
70. See text accompanying notes 71-106 infra.
71. 268 Ark. 227, 595 S.W.2d 659 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 843.
72. Id at 236, 595 S.W.2d at 664.
73. Id at 237, 595 S.W.2d at 665 (navigability decided for use and not for determina-
tion of who holds title).
74. Id at 237, 595 S.W.2d at 665. The court based its holding in part upon the decision
in Barboro v. Boyle, 119 Ark. 377, 178 S.W. 378 (1915), a case which anticipated recreational
use of waterways. The MeIlroy court described the anticipation of recreational use by the
Barboro court as "almost prophetic." McI/roy, 268 Ark. at 235, 595 S.W.2d at 664. The
language from Barboro emphasized by Melroy is: "/Y7he waters of the lake might be used to
a much greater extent for boating, forpleasure, for bathingfishing and hunting than they are
now used " Id at 236, 595 S.W.2d at 664 (emphasis added by MeIlroy). But see hicifroy,
268 Ark. at 240, 595 S.W.2d at 666 (Fogelman, J., dissenting) (criticism of the majority's use
of Barboro).
75. Mlroy, 268 Ark. at 237, 595 S.W.2d at 665.
76. Id
77. 51 Mich. App. 176, 214 N.W.2d 856 (1974).
78. Id at 184, 214 N.W.2d at 860.
79. Id at 183, 214 N.W.2d at 860.
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abandoned the strict commercial test of navigability developed in the
nineteenth century: "[W]e must ... strive to mold the concept of navi-
gability to the needs of the later 20th century."8 In Michigan, even if a
waterway is found to be navigable, title to the bed is vested in the ripa-
rian owner subject to public rights of fishing and navigation.81 There-
fore, title to the bed is not an issue.
Kelley involved a Michigan fishing statute which provides: "That
in any of the navigable waters of this state ... the people shall have
the right to catch fish with hook and line. .. *82 Plaintiffs in the case
instituted this action to have the river declared navigable so that the
public rights created by that statute could be enforced.
3
In 1975, the Court of Appeals of Ohio in State ex rel Brown v.
Newport Concrete Co. ,4 mandated that courts use a recreational use
standard in determining navigability: "We hold that the modem utili-
zation of our waters by our citizens requires that our courts, in their
judicial interpretation of the navigability of such waters, consider their
recreational use as well as the more traditional criteria of commercial
use."85 The court in Brown made the important distinction between
determinations of the usage of the waterway and who holds title to the
bed of the waterway. In doing so, the court did not declare that title to
the bed was in the state, but held that the public has a right to use the
water. The court stated: "IThe fundamental question here is not
whether the defendant has title to the soil under the water, but whether
the river at this location can be determined from the facts presented to
be a 'navigable' stream, and therefore subject to the general public use
for navigation purposes."8 6 The court found that the stream was navi-
gable and, therefore, subject to general public use.8 7
The California Court of Appeal addressed the question of naviga-
bility in two cases decided in the 1970's. The court looked to a recrea-
tional use standard both in People v. Mack,"8 and the later case of
Hitchings v. Del Rio Woods Recreation and Park District.89 The Mack
court made the distinction between title issues and use issues when it
declared: "[Tihe real question here is not of title but whether the pub-
80. Id at 179, 214 N.W.2d at 858.
81. Id at 185, 214 N.W.2d at 860.
82. Id at 177, 214 N.W.2d at 857 (citation of MICH. COMP. LAWS § 307.41 (1981)
(MICH. STAT. ANN. § 13.1681 (Callaghan 1981))).
83. 51 Mich. App. at 177-78, 214 N.W.2d at 857.
84. 44 Ohio App. 2d 121, 336 N.E.2d 453 (1975).
85. id at 127, 336 N.E.2d at 457.
86. Id at 124, 336 N.E.2d at 455 (emphasis added).
87. Id at 127-28, 336 N.E.2d at 457.
88. 19 Cal. App. 3d 1040,97 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1971). Seegeneraly Case Comment, Peo-
ple v. Mack: A Sportman's Deinition of Navigability, 3 ENVTL. L. 68 (1973).
89. 55 CaL App. 3d 560, 127 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1976).
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lic has the right of fishing and navigation."9 Mack established a test
for navigability which included "waters ... which are capable of be-
ing navigated by oar or motor propelled small craft."91
Hitchings expanded Mack to include waterways that are navigable
for only part of a year. The river at issue was navigable for only nine
months each year. The court said this was "a sufficient period to make
it suitable, useful and valuable as a public recreational highway for
most of the year, and therefore it is navigable in law."92
In the 1974 case Southern Idaho Fish & Game Association v. Picabo
Livestock Co. ,9 the Idaho Supreme Court found that a waterway
which flows through privately-owned land was navigable and could be
used for recreational purposes. The dispute in Picabo arose when the
defendant-landowner ordered several fishermen, who were fishing from
boats in the creek where it flowed through his land, to leave because
they did not have permission to be there.94 The plaintiff then brought
an action for declaratory judgment to have the court determine the
rights the parties involved.9" Picabo is significant because the court uti-
lized a recreational use standard96 in addition to the traditional float-
ing-log standard97 in determining navigability. 98 In finding that the
creek was navigable, the supreme court adopted the trial court's defini-
tion of navigability: "Any stream which, in its natural state, will float
logs or any other commercial or floatable commodity, or is capable of
being navigated by oar or motor propelled small craft, for pleasure or
commercial purposes, is navigable."99 The supreme court said: "In so
holding, the trial court reasoned that in accordance with modem au-
thorities, the basic question of navigability is simply the suitability of a
particular water for public use."o
The court based its decision partially upon the public water doc-
trine.10 1 The court found that "title to all water in Silver Creek belongs
to the State of Idaho,. . . and that there is an easement in the state on
behalf of the public for a right of way through the natural channels of
[the creek]."' 1 2
90. 19 Cal. App. 3d at 1051, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 454.
91. Id
92. 55 Cal. App. 3d at 571, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
93. 96 Idaho 360, 528 P.2d 1295 (1974).
94. Id at 361, 528 P.2d at 1296.
95. Id at 361, 528 P.2d at 1296.
96. Id at 362, 528 P.2d at 1297.
97. Id at 361-62, 528 P.2d at 1296-97. See also text accompanying notes 59-60, supra.
98. Id at 362-63, 528 P.2d at 1297-98.
99. Id at 362, 528 P.2d at 1297.
100. Id at 362-63, 528 P.2d at 1297-98.
101. See generally text accompanying notes 107-25 infra.
102. 96 Idaho at 362, 528 P.2d at 1297.
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Picabo is also significant for its interpretation of Idaho's former
fishing statute, which is similar to Montana's current fishing statute.103
The former Idaho statute, repealed in 1976, provided in part: "Naviga-
ble rivers, sloughs or streams. . . shall. . . be public highways for the
purpose of angling or fishing. . . subject to the right of any person
owning a fish license of this state... ." 1 In analyzing public rights
in light of this statute, Picabo established that the public's right to use
the creek "extended not only to the incidents of fishing.. . but also
boating, swimming, hunting, and all recreational purposes."105
As these cases show, states may employ a test based upon a recrea-
tional use standard for determination of public rights to use water in a
waterway, but may not employ such a test for determination of who
holds title to the bed of a waterway.10
6
III. WATER Is HELD BY THE STATE FOR PUBLIC USE
Authorities tend to agree that ownership of water is vested in the
sovereign and is held in trust for use of the people.' 0 7 The western
states particularly have taken a protective view of the waters within
their borders.'08 This is evidenced by language in various state consti-
tutions or statutes granting ownership of water to the people.'0 9
This section will discuss public rights in non-navigable water-
ways.' 10 The theory here is that since the waters are publicly owned,
the public has the right to use the waters even though they may flow
over land which is held privately."' The supreme courts of New Mex-
ico, Wyoming, and Missouri have decided cases based upon the belief
"that waters do not belong to the owners of the land through which
they flow; they belong to the public.""' 2
The New Mexico case, State v. RedRiver Valley Co. ,"3 decided in
1945, involved a declaratory action brought by the state to determine
whether it could open waters flowing over private land for public fish-
103. MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED [hereinafter cited as MCA] § 87-2-305 (1981) (sec-
tion text provided at note 165 infra).
104. Idaho at 362, 528 P.2d at 1297 (citation of IDAHO CODE § 36-901 (repealed 1976)).
105. Id at 362, 528 P.2d at 1297.
106. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926) (mandated that the federal test
apply when determining title).
107. Abrams, supra note 7, at 171-72.
108. See WATRmS, supra note 8, at 240.
109. Professor Stone catalogs language from statutes and constitutions of eighteen west-
em states dealing with ownership of water. All of the provisions listed still in effect use the
terms "public" or "people" in their description of ownership. Id at 242-44.
110. Seegeneraly Annot., 6 A.L.R.4th 1030 (1981).
111. Abrams, supra note 7, at 162.
112. Stone, supra note 12, at 8.
113. 51 N.M. 207, 182 P.2d 421 (1945).
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ing. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that fishing is a beneficial
use. It stated: "[T]he waters in question were, and are, public wa-
ters .... The right of the public, the state, to enjoy the use of the
public waters in question cannot be foreclosed .. ". -"14
The Wyoming Supreme Court took a similar approach in the 1961
case Day v. Armstrong, "5 which arose out of a dispute involving a non-
navigable river. In describing the rights of the public, the court stated:
"[R]iparian ownership to the center of nonnavigable streams need not
necessarily materially interfere with and does not necessarily prevent
the State's use of waters for purposes for which they are adaptable and
to which they may be put for the equal benefit of all members of the
public."'1 16 The court in Day summarized: "Irrespective of the owner-
ship of the bed or channel of waters, and irrespective of their navigabil-
ity, the public has the right to use public waters of this State for floating
usable craft and that use may not be interfered with or curtailed by any
landowner."' 17 The court analyzed the language from the state consti-
tution and stated: "[O]ur Wyoming Constitution declares that all natu-
ral streams, springs, lakes, or other collections of still water . . . are
property of the state.""'  However, the court stated that even though
members of the public had the right to float the river, they did not have
the right to unrestricted use of the river bed: "[I]n using the State's
waters for floating, the public is not privileged, except as incidental to
such use, to violate other property rights of riparian owners."119 The
court explained:
The title to waters within the State being in the State,
there must be an easement on behalf of the State for a right of
way through their natural channels. . . . The waters. . . are
available for such uses by the public of which they are capa-
ble. When waters are able to float craft, they may be so
used.' 20
The Missouri Supreme Court extended the "public water" doc-
trine the furthest of any jurisdiction.' 2 ' In Elder v. Delcour,122 the court
held that members of the public have the right to wade in a non-navi-
114. Id at 228, 182 P.2d at 434.
115. 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961).
116. Id at 144.
117. Id at 145.
118. Id
119. Id at 146 (express refusal to adopt holding in Elder v. Delcour, 241 Mo. App. 839,
263 S.W.2d 221, rev'd 364 Mo. 835, 269 S.W.2d 17 (1954), which allowed wading or walking
upon the bed).
120. Id (citations omitted).
121. See Johnson and Austin, supra note 10, at 46. Cf. Day, 362 P.2d at 146, where the
Wyoming court specifically rejected the Missouri rule from Elder.
122. 364 Mo. 835, 269 S.W.2d 17 (1954).
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gable waterway, the bed of which is privately owned. 123 The court, in
holding that the defendant-wader had not trespassed, stated: "[W]e
must and do hold that the waters of the Meramec River are public
waters and the submerged area of its channel over and across appellant's
farm is apublic highway for travel and passage by floating and by wad-
ing, for business or for pleasure .... "I'
Elder is significant because the court not only found that people
have the right to use the surface of the water in a waterway for recrea-
tional use, but also the right, in some cases, to use the bed of the water-
way for purposes such as wading. 125 Thus, Elder goes one step beyond
Day and holds that people have a right to use beds of privately-owned
waterways in addition to the surfaces.
In a Colorado decision contrary to the above three cases, People v.
Emmert,126 the Colorado Supreme Court found that a group of floaters
were properly convicted of criminal trespass 127 when they floated in a
raft down a non-navigable river crossing a privately owned ranch. 128
Even though they touched the riverbed to aid in floating, they did not
leave their rafts or touch any dry land owned by the ranch.' 29 The
court rejected the contention of the defendant-floaters 3 ° that they
lawfully floated through the ranch as a matter of right under authority
of the Colorado Constitution. 13  The court based its rejection of the
constitutional argument on the premise that Colorado waters are public
property only for "the right of appropriation in this state."'13 2 The
court rejected the reasoning of the Wyoming court in Day, and stated
that the Wyoming Constitution does not mention appropriation. 33
The analysis used by the court in Emmert seems to indicate that the
decision was based upon property law, 134 not water law, as were the
123. Id at 848, 269 S.W.2d at 27.
124. Id at 847, 269 S.W.2d at 26 (emphasis added).
125. Id
126. 198 Colo. 137, 597 P.2d 1025 (1979).
127. Id at 139, 597 P.2d at 1026.
128. Id
129. Id
130. Id at 140, 597 P.2d at 1027.
131. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5 is under the heading "IRRIGATION" and is entitled:
"Water of streams public property." It provides:
The water of every natural stream, not heretofore appropriated, within the state of
Colorado, is hereby declared to be the property of the public, and the same is
dedicated to the use of the people of the state, subject to appropriation as hereinaf-
ter provided.
132. 198 Colo. at 141-42, 597 P.2d at 1027-28.
133. Id at 142-43, 597 P.2d at 1028.
134. The common law rule holds that he who owns the surface of the ground has
the exclusive right to everything which is above it ("cuies est solum, ejus est usque
adcoelum"). This fundamental rule of property law has been recognized not only
judicially but also by our General Assembly ....
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three decisions discussed above.
Emmert's significance is its rejection of the defendant-floaters' con-
tentions that they had a right under the Colorado Constitution to use
the waters in the river for recreational purposes. It is the minority view
of the small number of states who have considered the question. Red
River, Day, and Elder represent the majority view holding that the
public has the right to use waters flowing within their state for recrea-
tional purposes, regardless of bed ownership.
135
IV. MONTANA'S SITUATION
The law in Montana with respect to the public's rights to use wa-
terways has not been clearly defined. This has caused some misunder-
standing regarding individual rights, 136 which is not surprising because
Montana has no statute and only a few court opinions defining the
rights of recreationists on Montana's waterways.' 37 The Montana Leg-
islature has declared that all navigable waterways are public ways, al-
though they do not specifically mention recreation as a public
purpose. 38  The Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks,
however, does use navigability in defining public rights in water-
ways.' 39 This section will examine public recreational water use rights
in light of the law in Montana.
A. Navigable Waterways
Throughout the years, Montana courts and the legislature, as well
as others, have provided definitions of navigable waterways."' Mon-
tana statutes define navigable waters, beginning first with navigable
Id at 140-41, 597 P.2d at 1027.
135. See text accompanying notes 112-25 supra.
136. The Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks distributes a brochure enti-
tled "Montana's Popular Floating Streams" (1977) in which it warns:
Most Montana rivers-even some of the most popular streams-flow through pri-
vate land. Some floaters incorrectly assume all land between high water marks is,
in essence, public land. Unfortunately, most river beds are legally classed as pri-
vate land. Floaters can be cited for trespassing if they leave their crafts.
137. See Stone, supra note 12, at 17-18.
138. MCA § 85-1-111 (1981) provides in pertinent part: "Navigable waters and all
streams of sufficient capacity to transport the products of the country are public ways for the
purpose of navigation and such transportation."
139. The Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks advises people on the pub-
lic's right to the use of waterways based upon whether the waterway has been declared
navigable. Conversation with LeRoy Ellig, Regional Supervisor of the Montana Depart-
ment of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks, in Bozeman, Mont. (Sept. 17, 1981) [hereinafter cited as
Ellig].
140. One of the first definitions of navigability was provided by Captain Meriwether
Lewis when he reported that the "Gallatin River is however the most rapid of the three
[Gallatin, Jefferson, and Madison], and though not quite as deep, yet navigable for a consid-
erable distance." 2 LEwiS AND CLARK JOURNALS 13 (1904).
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lakes: "All lakes ... which have been meandered' . .. and all lakes
which are navigable in fact are hereby declared to be navigable and
public waters."'142 Navigable rivers and streams are those "which have
been meandered ... and all... which are navigable in fact."'
143
The Montana Supreme Court, over eighty-five years ago in Gibson
v. Kelly, 44 defined navigable waterway: "[A] stream navigable in fact
is navigable in law."' 45 This standard follows the strict test for naviga-
ble waterways and is consistent with the federal test. 4" Since Gibson,
the court has never been called upon to define navigable waterway in a
recreational use case. The controversy in Gibson was a title dispute' 47
and not a dispute over recreational water use. This leaves open the
possibility that the court will follow the modem trend and adopt a less
restrictive recreational use standard for determination of navigability
when confronted with a dispute over recreational water use.
Navigable waterways have been defined in the Opinions of the At-
torneys General in Montana. In 193 1, the Attorney General rejected a
"canoe test" for determining navigability. 48 The same opinion sug-
gested that the "meander test" should apply for determination of navi-
gability.149 This seems to be consistent with the statutory definition of
141. Meander lines are lines on a survey map which define the banks of waterways.
Supposedly, if the surveyor thought that a waterway was important enough, ie. navigable,
then the surveyor would indicate that waterway with meander lines. Otherwise, the sur-
veyor would ignore the waterway and draw the township and section lines across the water-
way. There are very few meandered waterways in Montana. Interview with Professor
Albert W. Stone, Professor of Law, University of Montana, in Missoula, Mont. (Oct. 13,
1981).
142. MCA § 85-1-112 (1981) provides:
(1) All lakes wholly or partly within this state which have been meandered and
returned as navigable by the surveyors employed by the government of the United
States and all lakes which are navigable in fact are hereby declared to be navigable
and public waters, and all persons shall have the same rights therein and thereto
that they have in and to any other navigable streams or public waters. (2) All
rivers and streams which have been meandered and returned as navigable by the
surveyors employed by the government of the United States and all rivers and
streams which are navigable in fact are hereby declared to be navigable.
143. Id
144. 15 Mont. 417, 39 P. 517 (1895).
145. Id at 422, 39 P. at 519.
146. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
147. 15 Mont. at 417-18, 39 P. at 518.
148. 14 MoNT. Op. A-r'y GEN. 195, 196 (1931).
149. A navigable stream is a stream which is considered capable of floating the
produce of the country to market; this might include timber and in a sense no
doubt the streams in question might be considered navigable streams for the pur-
pose above mentioned. . . . [A] better test would be as to whether or not the land
bordering on the stream has been meandered.
Id The opinion, citing Faucett v. Dewey Lumber Co., 82 Mont. 250, 266 P. 646, defines
meander lines as "merely for the purpose of determining the amount of land for which the
owner originally paid the United States." 14 MoNT. Op. Arr'y GEN. 195, 196 (1931).
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navigable waterways. 50 However, the U.S. Supreme Court has ques-
tioned the accuracy of the meander test for determination of navigabil-
ity because government surveyors who made the meander lines were
"not clothed with power to settle questions of navigability."' Another
Attorney General, in 1954, defined navigable waterways by using a def-
inition harmonious with the federal test of navigation: "[A]ll streams,
capable of floating logs or which have floated logs to the mill or market
are ... navigable in fact."'
' 52
By statute, Montana has declared that the state is owner of all land
below navigable waterways. 153 Title to the beds of all navigable water-
ways passed to the state at the time of statehood. 5 4 Under a principle
called the "Public Trust Doctrine,"'155 the state owns the beds of navi-
gable waterways and holds them in trust for use by the people. 6
B. High and Low Water Marks
After the American Revolution, the states succeeded to ownership
of land beneath navigable waters and were permitted to determine for
themselves whether the ownership extended to the high water mark or
to the low water mark.'57 States admitted after the original thirteen
were also permitted to make this determination because they have the
same sovereignty as the original thirteen.' 58 In 1895, Montana, by both
statute159 and court decision, 60 opted for state ownership of the bed
150. MCA § 85-1-112 (1981).
151. Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 585 (1922) noted in Stone, supra note 12, at 5
n.25.
152. [A]Il streams, capable of floating logs or which have floated logs to the mill or
market are by the enactment of Chapter 95, Laws of 1933 [Now codified as MCA
§ 85-1-112 (1981)] made navigable in fact. . . . [T]he legislature has by the above
enactment allowed all streams in the above category to be navigable in fact, and
that the access provisions of the code immediately apply.
25 MONT. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 179, 181 (1954).
153. MCA § 70-1-202 (1981) provides: "The state is the owner of-(l) all land below
the water of a navigable lake or stream .... "
154. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 553-57 (1981) (applied to the bed of the
Big Horn River in Montana).
155. YANNACONE, COHEN, & DAVISON, I ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
§ 2:3 (1972) [hereinafter cited as YANNACONE] (good discussion of the Public Trust
Doctrine).
156. Id at 2:3, at 16.
157. Seven states elected the low water mark while six chose the high water mark. Id at
17.
158. Id § 2:3, at 18.
159. MCA § 70-16-201 (1981) provides:
Except where the grant under which the land is held indicated a different intent,
the owner of the land, when it borders upon a navigable lake or stream, takes to the
edge of the lake or stream at low-water mark; when it borders upon any other
water, the owner takes to the middle of the lake or stream. (emphasis added).
The statute was enacted in 1895, the same year as Gibson v. Kelly, 15 Mont. 417, 39 P. 517
(1895).
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only to the low water mark.'61
Since water is always moving, the determination of exactly where
a high or low water mark falls is difficult to make. The Montana
Supreme Court has never defined either term, but Montana Attorneys
General have struggled with high water marks throughout the years.
For instance, in 1942, the Attorney General defined "high water mark"
as:
[T]he line which defines that part of the bed of a navigable
stream which... is submerged so long as so frequently in
ordinary seasons that vegatation does not grow upon it; the
great annual rises of the river ... or any unusual floods do
not have any effect... upon the location of the high water
mark . 162
While Montana is silent on the question, authorities tend to agree that
determinations of high and low water marks are questions to be de-
cided by the trier of fact.1 63
Even though riparian and littoral landowners may own to the low
water mark of a navigable waterway, the public has an easement on the
strip between the high and low water marks for recreational purposes.
The court in Gibson, albeit dictum, stated: "It is true that, while the
abutting owner owns to the low water mark on navigable rivers, still
the public have certain rights of navigation and fishery upon the river
and upon the strip in question."'" Furthermore, a Montana statute1 65
160. Gibson v. Kelly, 15 Mont. 417, 422, 39 P. 517, 519 (1895). The court discusses what
is now MCA § 70-16-201 (1981): "We refrain from an elaborate presentation of our grounds
for this holding. . for the reason that the rule thus announced by decision will become in a
few months the rule by statute." 15 Mont. at 422, 39 P. at 519.
161. But see: The Montana Attorney General in 1911, only sixteen years after the adop-
tion of the statute and case declaring state ownership only to the low water mark, took the
position that the state owned the land between the high and low water marks. 4 MoNT. Op,.
A'r'y GEN. 61 (1911). Attorney General Albert J. Galen said that: "[The state [has] own-
ership and control of land between high and low water mark and that comprising the bed of
navigable streams or lakes . . . ." Id However, in 1925, the Montana Supreme Court
again affirmed the original doctrine that the state's ownership extends only to the low water
mark. Herrin v. Sutherland, 74 Mont. 587, 595, 241 P. 328, 331 (1925).
Authorities have questioned whether a state has the power to give up ownership of land
under a navigable waterway including that between the high and low water marks. See
generally YANNACONE, supra note 155, § 2:3. The holding in Gibson, 15 Mont. at 422, 39 P.
at 519 was based largely upon what is now MCA § 70-16-201 (1981), which was adopted
from California (CAL. CIV. CODE § 830 (West 1954)). See Comment, 12 U.C.D. L. REv. 125
(1979) (arguing that the true boundary in California, notwithstanding the statute, is the high
water mark because of persuasive precedent supporting this position).
162. 19 MONT. Op. A-r'y GEN. 631, 633 (1942).
163. E.g., Anderson v. Ray, 37 S.D. 17, 26, 156 N.W. 591, 594 (1916); GOULD ON WA-
TERs § 76, at 150 (1900).
164. Gibson, 15 Mont. at 423, 39 P. at 519.
165. MCA § 87-2-305 (1981) provides in pertinent part:
Navigable rivers, sloughs, or streams between the lines of ordinary high water
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provides that navigable waterways between "the high water flow lines"
shall be subject to the right of any person owning an angler's license
who desires to fish along those banks.
166
C. Montana's Application of the Public Water Doctrine
Like most western states, 167 Montana has a constitution providing
for state ownership of all water within the state: "All surface, 168 under-
ground, flood, and atmospheric waters within the boundaries of the
state are the property of the state for the use of its people and are sub-
ject to appropriation for beneficial uses as provided by law."' 1 69 The
delegates to the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention specifically
intended this language to insure that the ownership of the water would
forever be vested in the state for the use of the people. 170 This feeling
was so strong that the delegates rejected an amendment which would
thereof of the state of Montana ... shall hereafter be public waters for the pur-
pose of angling, and any rights of title to such streams or the land between the high
waterflow lines ... shall be subject to the right of any person owning an angler's
license of this state who desires to angle therein or along their banks . (em-
phasis added).
166. See generally text accompanying notes 82-83 and 103-05 supra.
167. See note 109 supra.
168. The term "surface" as used in this context means all water above ground including
that found in waterways. Interview with Professor Albert W. Stone, Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of Montana, in Missoula, Mont. (Oct. 9, 1981). Cf., a second definition of "surface"
waters: "[That water which is diffused over the ground from falling rains or melting snows
and continues to be such until it reaches some bed or channel in which water is accustomed
to flow." Fordham v. Northern Pac. Ry., 30 Mont. 421, 430, 76 P. 1040, 1043 (1904).
169. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 3(3). The language in the constitution is substantially dif-
ferent from that found in the 1889 constitution. The 1889 language was: "The use of all
water now appropriated, or that may hereafter be appropriated for sale, rental, distribution,
or other beneficial use. . . shall be held to be a public use." MONT. CONST. art. III, 15
(1889).
170. Charles B. McNeil, member, Committee on Natural Resources and Agriculture,
1972 Constitutional Convention, explained the language as follows:
The source of that language we considered carefully. We carefully considered Col-
orado's, which has been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court and it says the water
belongs to the people. We had four delegate proposals introduced. Two of them
said it belonged to the state and two of them said it belonged to the people. So, I
said it belonged to the state for the use of the people.
6 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 4037. (March
2, 1972). [hereinafter cited as TRANSCRIPT].
The actual language in the Colorado Constitution is "public," not "people." CoLo.
CONST. art. XVI, § 5. (full text of this provision at note 131 supra).
The official comment of the committee on this issue was:
Subsection (3) is a new provision to establish ownership of all waters in the state
subject to use by the people. This does not in any way affect the past, present or
future right to appropriate water for beneficial uses and is intended to recognize
Montana Supreme Court decisions and guarantee the state of Montana standing to
claim all of its water for use by the people of Montana in matters involving other
states and the United States government.
MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMENTS, COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RE-
SOURCES AND AGRICULTURE 10-11 (1972).
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have eliminated the words "for the use of its people" from that sec-
tion.' 7 ' Apparently, it was the intention of the delegates that recrea-
tional use was one of the uses to be protected. 172
The Montana Supreme Court considered public use of a non-navi-
gable waterway in 1925 in Herrin v. Sutherland.'73 In Herrin, a man
waded from the navigable Missouri River into a non-navigable
stream. 174 The court found that the man trespassed when he waded on
the bed of a privately owned creek.'7 5 The court said: "It would seem
clear that a man has no right to fish where he has no right to be."' 176
However, Herrin was decided well before the adoption of Montana's
1972 constitution.'77 The court did not have the opportunity to deter-
mine the rights of the public to use publicly owned water for recrea-
tional purposes as have courts in other states with similar constitutional
provisions. 78
The Montana Supreme Court through the years has emphasized
that water use within the state is a "public use."' 179 Although the court
has never called recreational use of water a "public use," it has hinted
that it could easily do so.'
171. TRANscRIPT, supra note 170, at 4042-43. Delegate Cedor B. Aronow, who wrote
the amendment stated his concern was that the words "for the use of its people" would
imply a right of access over private lands to the waterways. Id at 4018. Delegate McNeil
assured him that was not the intention. Id
172. Delegate Aronow, author of the amendment discussed in note 171 supra, acknowl-
edged that use of waterways should be allowed. TRANSCRIPT, supra note 170, at 4022. In a
question-answer exchange with Convention Chairman Leo Graybill, Jr., Aronow explained:
CHAIRMAN GRAYBILL: Do I understand it to be the sense of your remarks, which
are of course in the record here, that a rancher could fence a fishing stream, a river,
so that I couldn't fish or boat or go up and down that river?
DELEGATE ARoNow: No, that is not the sense of my remarks. You can go up and
down that stream all you want to. The only thing is you can't drive across the
rancher's land willy-nilly in order to get to it. You can go along county roads or
wherever there's access. You certainly may boat. You may hike up and down that
stream.
Id
173. 74 Mont. 587, 241 P. 328 (1925). But see Stone, supra note 12, at 10-12 (criticism of
the holding in Herrin).
174. Id at 590, 241 P. at 329.
175. Id at 596, 241 P. at 331.
176. Id
177. The constitution became effective July 1, 1973, replacing Montana's original consti-
tution adopted in 1889.
178. See text accompanying notes 112-34 supra.
179. See HuTrcunws, THE MONTANA LAW OF WATER RIGHTS 1-3 (1958).
180. In Paradise Rainbow v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 148 Mont. 412, 421 P.2d 717
(1966), the court said: "Under the proper circumstances, we feel that such a public interest
[in water] should be recognized." Id at 418-20. See Stone, supra note 12, at 16-18 (discus-
sion of Paradise Rainbow).
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D. Navigable Waters Subject to Fishing Rights
In 1933, the Montana Legislature' 81 enacted what is now section
87-2-305 (the fishing statute) of the Montana Code. It provides that all
navigable waterways shall be open for fishing to anyone owning an
angler's license.'82 It appears to include fishing while floating as well as
fishing from the bank. 183 Through this statute, the legislature has man-
dated that the public may use navigable waterways for recreational
fishing.
As noted above, 184 Montana's fishing statute'8 5 is similar to
Idaho's former fishing statute.'86 In Southern Idaho Fish and Game As-
sociation v. Picabo Livestock, Inc. ,87 the Idaho Supreme Court inter-
preted that statute'8 8 to mean that the public could use navigable
waterways for "boating, swimming, hunting, and all recreational pur-
poses" as well as fishing. 1 89
181. House Bill 259 was introduced by the Committee on Fish and Game and assigned
to that committee on February 10, 1933. It went through the legislative process and was
signed by the governor on March 7, 1933 enacting what is now MCA § 87-2-305 (1981).
House Journal 1933. The bill generated almost no public comment at the time. Letter from
Bob Clark, Montana Historical Society Librarian, to author (Sept. 21, 1981) [hereinafter
cited as Clark letter]. The minutes of the Fish and Game Commission from September 27,
1932, indicate a possible reason for the introduction of the bill:
[Commissioner William] Steinbrenner presented a letter addressed to him from
Mr. Frank Woody, Helena attorney. Mr. Woody explained that there is a new
situation on the Madison River which needs attention. For a distance of about five
miles, property owners on both sides of the Madison River have posted their prop-
erty against trespassing, and will not allow fishermen thereon unless they pay a fee
of $1.00 each. This practice is most objectionable, and Mr. Woody presented a bill
for the consideration of the Commission, to be presented to the Legislature prohib-
iting the practice of charging fishermen to enter property. [State Fish and Game
Warden and Secretary of the Commission Charles B.] Marrs was authorized to
write Mr. Woody that the question will be given consideration by the Commission.
Copies of this bill were furnished the Commissioners. Mr. Marrs reported that he
had requested from the Attorney General an opinion as to whether the property
owner has the right to make such a charge, and to so post his property.
Minutes, Montana Fish and Game Commission 245 (Sept. 27, 1932). Apparently, the attor-
ney general did not issue the opinion requested. Clark letter, supra.
182. This section in full provides:
Navigable rivers, sloughs, or streams between the lines of ordinary high water
thereof of the state of Montana and all rivers, sloughs, and streams flowing through
any public lands of the state shall hereafter be public waters for the purpose of
angling, and any rights of title to such streams or the land between the high water
flow lines or within the meander lines of navigable streams shall be subject to the
right of any person owning an angler's license of this state who desires to go therein
or along their banks to go upon the same for such purpose.
MCA § 87-2-305 (1981).
183. Id
184. See text accompanying note 103 supra.
185. MCA § 87-2-305 (1981).
186. IDAHO CODE § 36-901 (repealed 1976).
187. 96 Idaho 360, 528 P.2d 1295 (1974).
188. IDAHO CODE § 36-901 (repealed 1976).
189. 96 Idaho at 362, 528 P.2d at 1297.
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Section 87-2-305 of the Montana Code190 was the subject of a con-
troversy in a Montana state district court case where a fisherman sued a
landowner to enforce his rights thereunder. In Martin v. Hintzpeter 9' a
case tried before a jury in Gallatin County in 1960, a fisherman wanted
to fish on the banks of the Gallatin River where it flowed through a
private landowner's property.' 92 The plaintiff contended the river was
navigable193 while the landowner insisted it was not.1 94 In returning a
plaintiff's verdict,19 the jury found that the Gallatin River was naviga-
ble1 96 and, therefore, open for fishing to anyone with a fishing license.
E. Spec/fc Navigable Waterways
Over the years, many waterways in Montana have been declared
navigable by decisions of various courts. Waterways and the decisions
finding them navigable are:
Missouri River-Herrin v. Sutherland,9 7 United States v. El-
dredge, 198 and Montana Power Company v. FederalPower
Commission .199
Gallatin River-Martin v. Hintzpeter,2 0° and Montana Wilder-
ness Association v. Board of Health and Environmental
Sciences. o2 0
Flathead Lake-Faucett v. Dewey Lumber Co. 202
Yellowstone River-Roe v. Newman. °3
Big Horn River-Montana v. United States.2 4
190. MCA § 87-2-305 (1981).
191. Nos. 14166 and 14167 (Mont. 18th Judicial Dist. Gallatin County 1960).
192. Complaint at 1, Id
193. Id
194. Answer at 1, Nos. 14166 and 14167 (Mont. 18th Judicial Dist. Gallatin County
1960). The presiding judge refused to give defendant's proposed jury instruction number 2,
which stated: "You are instructed that the Gallatin River is not a navigable stream."
195. Judgement at 2, Nos. 14166 and 14167 (Mont. 18th Judicial Dist. Gallatin County
1960). Even though the jury found for the plaintiff, they awarded him no damages. Id
196. Jury Instruction No. 10 read as follows: "You are instructed that a navigable
stream or river is one capable of being used in its ordinary condition by the public at all
times or periodically during the year for times long enough to make it susceptible of benefi-
cial use to the public as a means of transportation." Nos. 14166 and 14167 (Mont. 18th
Judicial Dist. Gallatin County 1960). The jury found that the Gallatin River was navigable;
therefore, plaintiff had a right to fish there.
197. 74 Mont. 587, 241 P.2d 328 (1925).
198. 33 F. Supp. 337 (1940).
199. 185 F.2d 491 (1950).
200. Nos. 14166 and 14167 (Mont. 18th Judicial Dist. Gallatin County 1960).
201. Nos. 37664 and 37154 (Mont. 1st Judicial Dist. Lewis and Clark County 1974).
202. 82 Mont. 250, 255, 266 P. 646, 647 (1928).
203. 162 Mont. 135, 139, 509 P.2d 844, 846 (1973).
204. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
PUBLIC LAND L4W REVIEW
F. Legislative Activity
Montana's Legislature has discussed recreational water use in al-
most every session during the 1970's, even though no legislation has
been enacted. 05 The subject provokes a great deal of interest through-
out the state.20 6 For example, a bill introduced in 1975,207 which was
defeated, would have provided that streams and rivers having a certain
mean annual flow may be utilized for recreational uses. 08
G. Other Aspects
Montana law allows the state to reserve waters for "existing or fu-
ture beneficial uses. ' '2°  The law also permits the Department of Fish,
Wildlife, and Parks to acquire land for recreational access sites.210
Another approach that has been taken in the area of recreational
use of waterways is prescription and dedication.2 1 Prescription is the
acquisition of an easement by adverse usage while dedication is the
appropriation of an easement for the use of the public. These are tradi-
tionally areas of property law, but they have been used in relation to
water law in such cases as beach access in California. 212
Another area worthy of note is access rights to waterways. In Her-
rin v. Sutherland, the Montana Supreme Court in dictum stated that the
public might have an easement over private land to "public land. 21 3
This would enable the public to have access over private land to get to
public waterways. This concept, however, is beyond the scope of this
writing and has been discussed elsewhere.214
205. Telephone interview with Representative Herb Huennekens, Montana House of
Representatives (Dec. 26, 1981).
206. Id
207. House Bill 79, 44th Mont. Legislature (1975).
208. Id
209. MCA § 85-2-316 (1981).
210. MCA § 87-2-316 (1981). See also MCA § 23-1-102 (1981). The Department of
Fish, Wildlife, and Parks no longer has the right of eminent domain to acquire such sites as
it did prior to October 1, 1981. The 1981 Legislature eliminated that power from the De-
partment. Act of Apr. 1, 1981, ch. 230, 1981 Mont. Laws 235 and Act of Apr. 17, 1981, ch.
418, 1981 Mont. Laws 727.
211. See generally WATERS, supra note 8, at 16-18.
212. See generally Note, Public Access to Beaches, 22 STAN. L. Rlv. 564 (1970) (discus-
sion of prescription and dedication as applied to California beaches).
213. If it be conceded also that by reason of the fact that he had no way of reaching
the public land except by going across plaintiff's ranch, and therefore the law pro-
vided for him a way by necessity under the doctrine laid down in Herrin v. Seiben,
46 Mont. 226, 127 P. 323, the defendant has not shown that he availed himself of
his remedy.
Herrin v. Sutherland, 74 Mont. 587, 600, 241 P. 328, 333 (1925).
214. WATERS, supra note 8, § 38.
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V. SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS
As we look toward the future with its increased population and
increased demand for recreational opportunities, it becomes apparent
that Montana should determine for all time the rights of the public to
use the state's water resources for recreation. This determination
should be done now while Montana still has an abundant supply of
water available for the use of its people.215
In order to aid in this determination, the archaic methods of navi-
gability and bed ownership should be eliminated and replaced with a
system based on opportunity for reasonable public use.2 16 Courts of
several other states have adopted such standards, noted elsewhere in
this comment, which should serve as models for Montana. For in-
stance, in determining public rights on a waterway, the Montana court
should set up a uniform standard to judge public rights. The court
should begin with the premise that that water is owned by the state and
is held in trust for the use of the people. It should then determine if the
waterway is available for significant public use. This can be done by
adopting one of the standards discussed above. Whatever the standard,
it should be based upon the waterway's capability for significant recre-
ational use. This designation would allow the court to reasonably de-
termine which waterways should be open for public use and could
protect all parties involved in the use of Montana's waterways. It
would insure the rights of the public as well as guaranteeing the rights
of landowners.
Paul L Frantz
215. Several authorities have discussed recreational use in terms of its amenity values.
See generally R. STRoup, M. COPELAND, R. RucKER, ESTIMATiON OF AMENITY VALuES AS
OPPORTUNITY COSTS FOR ENERGY RELATED WATER USE iN MONTANA (Report No. 81,
Montana University Joint Water Resources Research Center, Dep't of Agricultural Eco-
nomics and Economics, Montana State University, August, 1976); Abrams, supra note 7 at
193-94.
216. See Abrams, supra note 7, at 160-61; Stone, sqpra note 12, at 17-18, and Ellig, supra
note 139 (advocating a standard based upon suitability).
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